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[Crim. No. 8139. In Bank. Mar.?:1, 1958.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LAWRENCE O'NEIL
SMITH, Appellant.
[1] Poisone-IDegal P088e88ion of Narcotics-Evidence.-Wbere

[I]

[3]

[4]

{5]

police officers, on obtaining information that defendant, a
known narcotic addict, had just purchased a "spoonful of
heroin" and that it would be on his person at a certain residence, went.to that residence, identified themselves, and, after
being admitted, entered a bedroom, saw defendant move hits
hand to his mouth and told him to "Spit it out," which he did,
emitting a package containing heroin, and where defendant
claimed that he was choked by one of the officers but there
was testimony to the contrary by one of the officers, the trial
court did not err in believing the officer's testimony.
Arrest-Withont Warrant-Bea.aonable Oause.-Reasouable
cause to justify an arrest may consitst of information obtained
from others and is not limited to evidence that would be admissible at the trial on the issue of guilt.
Id.-Without Warrant-lLeasonable Oanae.-Where police offlcers had reasonable grounds to rely on an informer's report
that defendant, a known drug addict, had just purchased
heroin and that he could be found with it at the place where
he was arrested, they were justified in arresting him.
Indictment and Information-Proof and Variance-Time.There was no fatal variance between an information alleging
that the date of the offense charged was April 8th and proof
that the date was March 8th, where defendant was not misled
in making his defense in view of the fact that he knew from
testimony given at the preliminary hearing that the date of
the alleged offense was Karch 8th and that hits own witne88es
testified to events on that date.
Criminal La'W-Plea--J'eopardy-Evidence.-On a plea of double jeopardy, extrinsic evidence its admissible on the trial to
identify the crime of which defen~ant was convicted.

[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Drugs and'Druggists, '47; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393 et seq.
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Arrest, ,10 et seq.; Am.Jur.. Arrest, ,48
et seq.
[4] See Oal.Jur.ld, Indictment and Information, § 95; Am.Jur.,
Indictment and Information, § 181.
MeR. Dig. lLeferences: [1] Poisons, § 15; [2, 3] Arrest, 112;
[4] Indictment and Information, § 111(3); [5] Criminal Law,
§ 198.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. H. Burton Noble, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for illegal possession of heroin. Judgment of
conviction affirmed.
Lawrence O'Neil Smith, in pro. per., and Ward Sullivan,
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E.
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The trial court sitting without a jury,
found defendant guilty of a felony violation of section 11500
of the Health and Safety Code. It also found that he was
previously convicted of narcotic addiction (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11721), a misdemeanor, and sentenced him to imprisonment in the state prison for a term prescribed by law.
(See Health & Saf. Code, § 11712.) Defendant appeals.
[1] A police officer of the Los Angeles Police Department,
on the day before the arrest, received information from an
informer that defendant had just purchased a "spoonful of
heroin" and that it would be on his person at a certain residence. The officer knew that defendant was a narcotic addict.
On the day of the arrest, two officers approached the house in
question and through a window observed defendant and a
woman sitting on a bed, but saw nothing incriminating. They
went to the front door and knocked. An elderly lady opened
the door. The officers identified themselves,· entered, and
walked toward the room where they had seen defendant. One
of the officers testified that the elderly lady then shouted,
"Lawrence, the police are here." The bedroom door was
closed, but the officers did not know if it was locked. Defendant's witnesses testified that the door was locked. When
the officers entered the bedroom, they saw defendant move
his hand to his mouth and told him to "Spit it out." There
is a conflict in the testimony as to whether defendant was
choked by one of the officers. Defendant spat out a packa~e
containing five rubber balloons later shown to contain heroin.
He admitted that the package was his and that he attempted
to swallow it when he heard the police at the door. The officers
then arrested him. The package containing the heroin was
introduced in evidence at the preliminary hearing.
At the trial the transcript of the preliminary hearing was
introduced in evidence. Defendant'8 motion to suppress the
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evidence on the ground that it had been obtained in violation
of the rules stated in Rockin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [72
S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 13961 and People v.
Martinez, 130 Cal.App.2d 54 [278 P.2d 261, was denied In
those cases the conduct condemned was brutal force, "conduct that shocks the conscience." In the Martinez case the
court said: "It is clear that the substance was choked out of
Martinez. The fact that the officers and Martinez were thrown
to the ground indicates the extent of the force that was
deemed necessary and that sufficient force was used to accomplish that purpose." (130 CalApp.2d54, 56.) Although
defendant's testimony would tend to show that the officer
choked. him, there was testimony to- the contrary by one of
the arresting officers. We cannot hold that the trial court
erred in believing the officer's testimony.
The officers had no search warrant and, apparently,
no warrant for defendant's arrest. Thus, the lawfulness of
the arrest turns on the question whether the officers had
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had committed
a felony. (People v. Boyles, 45 Ca12d 652,655-656 [290 P.2d
535].)
[2] Reasonable cause to justify an arrest may consist of information obtained from others and is not limited to evidence
thai would be admissible at the trial on the issue of guilt.
(People v. Boyles, supra; Wmson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.
2d 291,294 [294 P.2d 36].) [3] If the officers had reasonable
grounds to rely on the informer's report that defendant had
just purchased heroin and that he could be found with it, at
the place where he was arrested, they were justified in arresting him. (Willson v. Superior Court, supra.) The record
supports the trial court's conclusion that the officer's past
experience with the informer,· together with their knowledge
that defendant was a drug addict, gave the officers reasonable
cause to believe that defendant h,ad committed a felony. More*One of the arresting officers telrtified:
"A. I have been tbere when he [tbe informant] bas given us approximately su otber bits of information and about three of tbem have
been--on three of them we have made arrests and the otber three we
just hit it too late.
"Q. Well, in those three bits of information where you made arrests,
tbose have been narcotic cases; is that correct! A. Yes:
• • Q. And when you would go out to where he would tell you to go did
you find any narcotics? A. Yes.
"TuIII CoUll'l'1 In other words, this infarmer is a reliable informer'
"TB1\ WI'l'NUS: Very reliable."
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over, at the trial defendant made no attempt to determine the
identity of the informer or to question his reliability.
[4] In his brief in propria persona, filed before the appointment of counsel, defendant contends, that there was a fatal
variance between the date of the offense charged in the information, April 8, 1956, and the date of the offense proved,
March 8, 1956. In People v. LaMarr, 20 Cal.2d 705,
711 [128 P.2d 845), this court stated: "An immaterial variance should be disregarded. (14 Cal.Jur. 96; People v. Mizer,
(1940),87 Cal.App.2d 148, 158-154 [99 P.2d 883).) The test
of the materiality of a variance is whether the indictment
or information so fully and correctly informs the defendant
of the criminal act with which he is charged that, taking into
consideration the proof which is introduced against him, he
is not misled in making his defense, or placed in danger of
being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Defendant was not misled in making his defense, for he knew
from the testimony given at the preliminary hearing that the
date of the alleged offense was March 8, 1956, and his own
witnesses testified to events on that date. [6] Nor is he in
danger of being placed in double jeopardy, for it is "well
settled that on a plea of double jeopardy, extrinsic evidence
is admissible on the trial to identify the crime of which a
defendant has been convicted." (People v. Williams, 27
Cal.2d 220,226 [163 P.2d 692).)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.

I

